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Abstract
This paper analyzes social group formation when agents are subject
to peer e®ects within groups increasing human capital and instantaneous
utility. When agents are heterogenous on two dimensions, ability and
social skills, and monetary payments are not feasible the model pre-
dicts segregation at the top and at the bottom of the attribute space
and bunching for heterogenous intermediate types. Groups may be het-
erogenous in taste types and more heterogenous types are more likely
to participate. The equilibrium allocation does not induce cost-e±cient
human capital accumulation. Introducing ability tracking may produce
bene¯cial results despite decreasing di®erences in human capital produc-
tion.
Keywords: Education, peer-e®ects, matching, group formation.
JEL: I21, C78, D51.
1 Introduction
Important aspects of the economic allocation are often crucially determined
by the allocation of social ties between economic agents. For instance, in
many economies an individual's success in encountering suitable employment
depends largely on the social ties this individual has. Studies pioneered by
Myers and Shultz (1951) ¯nd that individuals frequently encounter new jobs
on the base of personal relationships. An individual with a greater number
of loose acquaintances stands a better chance of encountering new employ-
ment (Granovetter, 1973). Other examples include trading networks where
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1trade opportunities are open only to network members, or implicit risk-sharing
agreements in social groups (for a recent survey on social networks see Jackson,
2005).
Therefore we argue that economic e±ciency of an allocation cannot be
evaluated independently of the formation of such social groups. When social
groups are formed by decentralized decision-making of economic agents, ob-
serving market prices for group membership or individual ties is quite unusual.
This is not to say that there does not exist a market and corresponding prices
for group membership, however prices may take the form of in kind payments
or the exchange of favors. This lack of observable transfers obstructs empiri-
cal research considerably. Therefore, one aim of this paper is to enable sharp
predictions on the observable outcome.
A natural although by no means exclusive example of productive activity
conducted jointly in social groups is that of human capital acquisition, espe-
cially in education.The particular allocation of students into social groups can
be expected to a®ect acquisition of human capital due to the widely observed
presence of peer e®ects. Peer e®ects are commonly found to provide a positive
in-group externality, thereby introducing a local public good in human capital
accumulation. A natural example are studying groups at university. The key
idea of this paper is to separate peer e®ects within groups into those that
a®ect primarily instantaneous utility and those that have a lasting e®ect on
agents' utility, for instance via an agent's attribute such as human capital. We
call the former consumption peer e®ects which may be thought of as favors
provided by group members to their group mates that have a predominantly
consumptive character. On the other hand, when peer e®ects a®ect the future
utility stream, most notably by changing an agent's characteristics such as
productivity, we use the term productive peer e®ects. That is, we argue that
group formation is determined not only by ability. Indeed, in a recent study
Heckman et al. (2006) present evidence that both cognitive and non-cognitive
abilities a®ect signi¯cantly agents' socio-economic outcomes.
In the process of social group formation individuals will be able to exploit
both types of peer e®ects to generate utility. Peer e®ects are assumed to be
subject to decreasing di®erences (see e.g. Hanushek et al., 2001, Vigdor and
Nechyba, 2004, for some empirical support of this hypothesis), this assumption
is not tight, however, and can be replaced by assuming there exist gains from
trade for some agents. Agents are heterogenous with respect to their ability
to produce each kind of peer e®ects. This introduces a possibility for agents to
"trade\ across the two dimensions. In the baseline model agents' attractiveness
for a potential match is determined exclusively by their type. Intuitively, a
2charming person can potentially make up for a certain de¯cit in skill { and vice
versa. Agents located on a componentwise extremum of the type space will,
however, fail to encounter any agents either acceptable or willing to accept and
segregate. This favors a decentralized allocation characterized by bunching,
that is heterogenous groups of intermediate types and homogeneous groups
of extreme types. In an extension we show that this intuition carries over to
attribute choice as long as agents cannot to commit to pre-speci¯ed investment
levels or the transferability of utility generated by the possibility to try harder
for a better match is su±ciently low.
Formally, the paper employs a one-sided static matching model with en-
dogenous group size and strictly nontransferable utility. It is well-known that
the matching pattern depends on agents' ability to transfer utility (e.g. Legros
and Newman, 2004, for results on assortative matching). Already Becker
(1973) shows that positive assortative matching occurs in spite of decreas-
ing di®erences of valuation functions under strictly nontransferable utility. In
contrast to this we do not ¯nd assortative matching on the entire type space
but segregation and bunching in di®erent regions of the type space. The
reason is that agents may compensate each other across dimensions. The de-
centralized allocation fails to maximize aggregate surplus or human capital
production since although heterogenous coalitions are formed, heterogeneous
matches tend to be constrained to types on the same level set only. This
means the model yields a set of testable predictions. Negative assortative
matching between agents of similar attractiveness to other agents implies that
the correlation between group members' attributes is not perfect and possibly
nonlinear. Some heterogeneity in taste types can be expected since the equi-
librium allows agents of di®erent taste types to match together if they have
a preference for their match's strength. Moreover, agents whose types have
extreme di®erences between dimensions gain most from group membership
implying high participation rate for these agents.
Recently, the results of the PISA studies have rekindled interest in edu-
cational policies such as ability tracking. Yet our model suggests that some
caution is appropriate concerning the introduction of ability tracking, that
is the sorting of students with respect to ability. Although human capital
production has decreasing di®erences we ¯nd that introducing ability track-
ing may indeed increase human capital production by altering the allocation
of social groups. Moreover, since equilibrium allocations tend to be Pareto
e±cient switching from one regime to another is bound to create losers.
This paper is related to the contributions of Epple and Romano (1998) and
Epple et al. (2002). They analyze school choice when agents di®er in income
3and ability and schools set admission fees and ability standards. Pro¯t max-
imization by schools then introduces a substitutability between income and
ability that leads to strati¯cation by income and ability, while we ¯nd nega-
tive assortive matching between agents of similar attractiveness when mone-
tary transfers are not feasible. This connects our paper also to earlier work on
Tiebout economies, see among others Conley and Wooders (2001) for a very
general setup. They ¯nd that core allocations do not necessarily exhibit ho-
mogeneity in taste, where taste refers to preference orderings over local public
good provision. Our model is able to replicate this ¯nding, in particular for
agents who have preferences valuing their respective strengths lower than their
weaknesses. Another contribution of this paper emerges when interpreting the
model as a pure exchange economy with indivisible goods. Our segregation re-
sult implies then that comparative advantage does not su±ce for trade, trade
rather tends to be limited to exploit absolute advantages on type level sets.
Finally, it stands to reason to take advantage of the model's predictions
on the nature of equilibrium matching patterns with respect to human capital
formation. In particular, the model's prediction of heterogeneous groups with
respect to ability and social competence contrasts with the observation that
agents tend to favor interaction with people similar to them, a feature known
as homophily. We are currently gathering survey data on studying group
formation among students at various German universities.
The paper proceeds by reviewing some empirical ¯ndings. Section 3 intro-
duces the baseline model without e®ort investments, where agents generate
peer e®ects according to their two-dimensional type. In section 4 we analyze
properties of the decentralized allocation of the baseline model. Section 5
considers an extension allowing for e®ort investments and section 6 concludes.
2 Empirical Findings
Let us ¯rst review the empirical evidence that has been collected on peer
e®ects in education. A general caveat is that empirical ¯ndings for class and
school level studies tend to be a®ected by a number of econometric problems.
This seems less to be the case for more recent room mate studies that can
make use of random assignments and smaller peer groups.
Peer e®ects exist and are positive.
There has emerged a quite large body of evidence stating that less able stu-
dents consistently tend to bene¯t from more able peer groups. One strand
of the literature observes positive peer e®ects on students' grades at school
4or classroom level for a number of countries.1 A second group of empirical
studies ¯nds positive peer e®ects between randomly assigned roommates at
college level.2
Less able students bene¯t more from more able peers than more
able students.
Hanushek et al. (2001) ¯nd that math test scores of bad students are a®ected
more by the presence of good peers at classroom level than the test scores
of good students, a ¯nding that is a±rmed by Schneeweis and Winter-Ebmer
(2005) for Austrian students with an emphasis on reading skills. Also a number
of studies of roommate peer e®ects (Winston and Zimmerman, 2003, Zimmer-
man, 2003, Hoel et al., 2004) ¯nd that low ability students are a®ected to a
greater extent by sharing rooms with high ability students than high ability
students. This points to decreasing returns to scale for peer e®ects.
Peer e®ects eventually decrease in group size.
In the study of Hoel et al. (2004) peer e®ects decrease as social group size
decreases. Maasoumi et al. (2004) ¯nd that whereas weak students bene¯t
more from good peers in small classes, strong students bene¯t more in large
classes. This lends some support to the view that peer e®ects are subject to
congestion, and, in particular, that congestion decreases in average ability of
the social group.
3 A Simple Model
3.1 Agents
In the model economy there live a continuum of agents. An agent is char-
acterized by his ability to generate consumption and production peer e®ects,
that is a tuple (°i;µi) 2 ¡ £ £ where ¡ where £ are compact subsets of R.
Denote such a tuple by i. Only ¯nitely many elements of ¡ £ £ are endowed
with positive Lebesgue measure of agents. The set of all tuples endowed with
positive measure is called the agent set I. An agent i's preference ordering
over exposure to consumption and production peer e®ects can be expressed
by an additively separable function, say ci+hi, where ci denotes consumption
1See Hanushek et al. (2001), Hoxby (2000), Vigdor and Nechyba (2004) for the US,
Robertson and Symons (2003) for the UK, McEwan (2003) for Chile, and Schneeweis and
Winter-Ebmer (2005) for Austria among others.
2See e.g. Sacerdote (2001), Winston and Zimmerman (2003), Zimmerman (2003), Hoel
et al. (2004).
5peer e®ects agent i is exposed to and hi the human capital accumulated by an
agent i.3
3.2 Groups
Agents may form social groups to bene¯t from peer e®ects. Membership
in a group is exclusive. A group in this model can be interpreted as an
organizational unit fully encompassing any direct utility bene¯ts emerging
from social interaction between agents. A group N is the set of its members
N = f(°1;µ1);:::;(°i;µi);:::;(°n;µn)g or, equivalently, the set of its members'
types. The size of group N is given by n. We assume that each member has
the possibility to unilaterally withdraw from a group and all members of a
group must consent to the entry of a new member.
A group member i's bene¯t from consumption peer e®ects within the group
is a function ci(:) of all group members' types.
ci = ci(N):
That is, consumption peer e®ects are a social activity generating utility for all
group members. A group member i's bene¯t from human capital production
is a function hi(:) depending on all group members' types as well.
hi = hi(N):
This means an agent not only raises her own human capital by her presence,
but also provides human capital to the remainder of the group. This gives au-
tomatically the outside option of an agent i who chooses to remain unmatched:
ci(fig) and hi(fig). Consistent with the empirical observations cited above,
the assumptions on the peer e®ects production functions are stated as follows.
Assumption 1 (Peer e®ect production) The peer e®ect production func-
tions ci(:) and hi(:) have the following properties.
(i) Regularity: For all i 2 I, ci(:) and hi(:) are continuously di®erentiable,
strictly increasing functions and symmetric in the arguments °j, respec-
tively µj, with j 6= i.












· 0 for all i;j 2 N;
3For instance, productive peer e®ects may determine an agent's human capital which in
turn determines the wage and thus lifetime consumption.
6(iii) Decreasing returns to size: For all (µ;°) = (µi;°i) with i 2 I
hi(N [ fin+1g) ¡ hi(N) < hi(N) ¡ hi(N n fing);
ci(N [ fin+1g) ¡ ci(N) < ci(N) ¡ ci(N n fing)
for all i 2 N with N = fi1;i2;:::;ing, n > 1 and µi = µ and °i = °.
(iv) Boundedness: For all i 2 I there exists ¹ n(µ;°) < 1 such that
hi( ¹ N)+ci( ¹ N)¡(hi( ¹ Nnfi¹ ng)+ci( ¹ Nnfi¹ ng)) · 0 where ¹ N = fi1;i2;:::;i¹ ng
with µij = µi and °ij = °i with j = 1;:::; ¹ n.
Part (i) ensures tractability of the model by assuming su±cient regularity on
the production functions. hi() and (ci(:) are de¯ned on R2n rather than on the
type space to ensure compatability with section 5 where e®ort is introduced.
(ii) re°ects the empirical ¯nding of decreasing returns to scale of peer e®ects in
human capital production. Consumption peer e®ects have decreasing returns
as well and there may be substitutability between consumption and produc-
tion peer e®ects, for instance due to a concave utility function.4 Part (iii)
re°ects a congestion e®ect on peer e®ects as the group size increases and the
group gets more crowded and (iv) ensures that group sizes are ¯nite as conges-
tion precludes additional bene¯ts from peer e®ects at some ¯nite group size.
Congestion is assumed to a®ect both consumption and production peer e®ect
production similarly as both e®ects work primarily through the same channel,
communication between agents. This is, for instance due to an agents' lim-
ited span of attention, severely impeded by congestion. Whether more or less
able groups have greater sizes depends on whether di®erences in peer e®ects
are decreasing or increasing in input levels, a property that appears hard to
ascertain in empirical studies.
3.3 Agents' valuations
An agent i's valuation from being matched into a particular social group N
depends on the types of the other group members and on his own type and is
denoted by vi.
vi(N) = ci(N) + hi(N):
This means an agent's valuation for a coalition N is the utility from being
exposed to the peer e®ects in the coalition. If an agent remains solitary his
4Note that this set of assumptions is not tight. The crucial assumption is that there exist
agent types that have gains from trade, in the sense that they mutually bene¯t from forming
a group with respect to segregation. This may stem from decreasing di®erences in peer e®ect
exposure, from agents' preferences or from concavity of the utility function.
7valuation is given by vi = vi(fig) ¸ 0. Note that vi(:) is submodular on
(£ £ ¡)jNj due to decreasing returns to scale in Assumption 1.
3.4 Group formation
Group formation occurs on a matching market under complete information.
Agents decide on whom to match into a group with and can commit to their
decision. Group membership is strictly voluntarily. As equilibrium concept
we choose a static one-sided matching equilibrium. Let F(I) denote the set
of all ¯nite subsets of the agent space I. Formally, a matching equilibrium in
this model is de¯ned as follows.
De¯nition 1 A matching equilibrium denoted by P¤ is a partition of the agent
space I into ¯nite coalitions such that
² P¤ is measure consistent, and
² @P0
i 2 F(I) such that
vi(P0
i) > vi(P¤
i ) 8i 2 P0
i (stability).
Measure consistency requires loosely speaking that the measure of ¯rst mem-
bers of a certain group equals the measure of second members etc. Stability
means that there exist no deviating coalition such that all members of the
deviating coalition are better o® than in the equilibrium allocation. Note that
this equilibrium is in fact equivalent to the f-core.5
3.5 Benchmark
Pareto optimality has not much bite in this framework, as introducing an ar-
bitrarily small degree of transferability into the model renders any matching
equilibrium allocation Pareto optimal. Therefore we introduce two concepts of
optimality that may be of interest from a policy perspective. For comparison
with a world in which utility is perfectly transferable consider ¯rst the objec-
tive to maximize the aggregate sum of utility in the economy, i.e. to ¯nding
a partition P of the type space into ¯nite groups such that
P
i2I vi(Pi) with
Pi 2 P is maximized. By decreasing di®erences of hi() and ci() for all i 2 I
under Assumption 1 it is straightforward that matching must be component-
wise negative assortative, that is µi > µj implies µl · µk for some l 2 Pi and
some k 2 Pj. Matching across dimensions must be negative assortative as
well for negative spillovers between dimension and there is no indication for
separability of both dimensions.6
5See Kaneko and Wooders (1986, 1996) on measure consistency and the f-core.
6If ci() has increasing di®erences for all i 2 I, the utility maximizing matching must
be negative assortative on £ and positive assortative on ¡. If there are positive spillovers
84 Properties of equilibrium
As a ¯rst step we verify that an equilibrium indeed exists. This is fairly
straightforward using a result by Kaneko and Wooders (1986). Thus it su±ces
to show that a characteristic function can be constructed from vi meeting some
regularity conditions and that per capita payo®s are bounded in all coalitions.
Proposition 1 A matching equilibrium P¤ exists.
Proof: In Appendix.
4.1 Matching Pattern
Of primary interest is, of course, the matching pattern that emerges in equi-
librium. Start by noting that an agent i can never persuade a social group
where every member's type on each dimension is at least as high as i's type
to let him join. This is a direct implication of strictly nontransferable utility
but does not imply it, see section 5. The agent i may, however, be able to
persuade a group to let him join if i replaces a member whose type is strictly
lower on one dimension at least.
Agent i in turn must prefer to join the group as well. Since all agents
can secure themselves at least the payo® from being member of a homogenous
group, this gives a lower bound on i's payo® in the group. Denote an optimally
sized homogenous coalition of agent type i by Ni. Hence, homogeneous groups
are not stable if there exists an agent i whose type is (i) lower on one dimension
and higher on the other than the group members' type, and (ii) there exist
gains from trade, that is i has an absolute advantage su±ciently great that
is valued by the group and vice versa. To formalize this intuition we say
agent i has absolute gains from trade with j if there exists x on the lattice
f(µi;°;i);(µj;°j)gmaxfjNij;jNjjg such that
vi(x) > vi(Ni) and vj(x) > vj(Nj):
We use this to derive a su±cient condition for the emergence of homogenous
groups in equilibrium.
Proposition 2 A homogeneous group of type (µ;°) agents cannot be blocked
if there does not exist a type (µ0;°0) with sgn(°N¡°M) 6= sgn(µN¡µM), j°¡°0j
and jµ ¡ µ0j su±ciently great, so that there exist mutual absolute gains from
trade between (µ;°) and (µ0;°0).
between dimensions, the benchmark allocation must have positive assortative matching be-
tween dimensions.
9Proof: Let N denote a homogenous group of agents of type (µN;°N) of size
n¤(µN;°N). Let n¤ = argmaxn vi(N). N cannot be blocked in an equilibrium
allocation P if there is no N0 with (µN;°N) 2 N0 such that for all i 2 N0 it
holds that vi(N0) > vi(N) if i 2 N and vj(N0) > vj(Pj) if j = 2 N. For an agent
j it must hold that vj(Pj) ¸ vj(M) where M is a homogenous group of type
(µj;°j) agents of optimal size m¤ as this gives the minimal payo® any agent
j can obtain in equilibrium. That is, N cannot be blocked if there does not
exist N0 with vi(N0) > vi(N) if i 2 N and vj(N0) > vj(M) if j = 2 N.
Note that if N0 exists, it must contain at least one agent of type (µM;°M)
with µN > µM and °N < °M or vice versa by monotonicity of hi(:) and
ci(:). Suppose without loss of generality that µN > µM and °N < °M.
Then the existence of N0 implies that there exists x on the lattice X =
f(µN;°N);(µM;°N)gmaxfn¤;m¤g such that hi(N) ¡ hi(x) < ci(x) ¡ ci(N) and
hj(x) ¡ hj(M) > cj(M) ¡ cj(x). This implies ci(M) ¡ ci(N) > hi(N) ¡ hi(x)
and cj(M)¡cj(x) < hj(N)¡hj(M), that is hi(x) > hi(N)¡(ci(M)¡ci(N))
and cj(x) > cj(M) ¡ (hj(N) ¡ hj(M)) for all i 2 N0 and N0 = x. Since
cj(x) > cj(x0) implies hi(x) < hi(x0), x;x0 2 X, and the lattice X is a dis-
crete space, there exist ^ c > 0 and ^ h > 0 such that ci(M) ¡ ci(N) > ^ c and
hi(N) ¡ hi(M) > ^ h for i 2 N, j 2 M. Because of monotonicity of hi() and
ci() there exist ^ µ > 0 and ^ ° > 0 such that °M ¡ °N > ^ ° and µN ¡ µM > ^ µ.
Moreover, the condition vi(x) > vi(N) and vj(x) > vj(M) for some x 2 X as
de¯ned above is the de¯nition of absolute gains from mutual trade for both i
and j.
That is, existence of N0 implies existence of a type (µM;°M) with sgn(°N ¡
°M) 6= sgn(µN¡µM), j°N¡°Mj > ^ ° and jµN¡µMj > ^ µ, and (µM;°M) such that
i has gains from trade with j and the reverse is true as well. The proposition
follows by contraposition. ¥
This means agents close to the border of the agent space on both di-
mensions segregate, as well as agents that do not have counterparts who are
similarly attractive, measured by the sum of attributes. Moreover, reversing
Proposition 2 implies that homogenous coalitions of both type (µ;°) and type
(µ0;°0) agents cannot be part of an equilibrium. This allows us to state the
following corollary.
Corollary 1 An allocation of only homogeneous groups of agents cannot be
stable if there exist types µ and µ0 with sgn(° ¡ °0) 6= sgn(µ ¡ µ0), both j° ¡ °0j
and jµ ¡ µ0j su±ciently great, and jµ + ° ¡ (µ0 + °0)j su±ciently small.
That is, whenever the attribute space is su±ciently large and su±ciently
rich, there will emerge heterogeneous coalitions formed by agents in the interior
10of the type space. In this case returns to specialization within a group are
su±ciently large to be exploited despite nontransferable utility. To capture
this idea let us introduce the concept of symmetric types of agents.
De¯nition 2 (Symmetric Types) Types J = f(µ1;°1);(µ2;°2);:::g are
- symmetric at n if there exists N¤(n) such that




@°l 8 l 6= j 2 N¤ for all j 2 J,
- symmetric if they are symmetric at n¤ and there exists
N¤ = argmaxN2fN¤(n):n2Ng vj(N) for all j 2 J.
For instance, in the most simple version of the model where vi = h(µ)+c(°)
and h(:) = c(:), i and j are symmetric types at even group sizes if µi = °j
and °i = µj and i, j, and k are symmetric types at odd group sizes if i and
j as above and µk = 1
2(µi + µj) = °k. Choosing a functional form h(µ) =
(
Pn
l=1 µl)1=n and likewise for c(:), types i and j are symmetric if µi = °i and
µi + µj ¸ 9
4.7 Note that heterogenous groups of agents with symmetric types
fully exploit the returns to specialization under strictly nontransferable utility.
Hence, coalitions of symmetric agents cannot be blocked. Indeed, whenever
the outside option of all agents are su±ciently low, that is when congestion is
not severe, we have the following.
Proposition 3 Let vi(fig) · vi(fi;ig) for all i 2 ¡ £ £. An allocation with
only heterogenous groups of symmetric agents is stable.
Proof: Let J be symmetric agents. We ¯rst show that in a coalition of sym-
metric agents at n, N¤(n) 2 Jn de¯ned as in De¯nition 2, an agent l = 2 N¤ is
preferred by i 2 J to j 6= i 2 J, i® µl+°l > µj+°j. Then we extend this result
to coalitions of symmetric agents with respect to deviations by any ¯nite set
of agents L = 2 N¤. Finally, we argue that under an allocation of only groups
of symmetric agents there exists no blocking coalition.
Let us look at agent i without loss of generality. For i to prefer l to j it
must hold that vi(fN0;lg) > vi(fN0;jg) where N0 = N¤ n fjg. This implies
hi(fN0;lg) ¡ hi(fN0;jg) > ci(fN0;jg) ¡ ci(fN0;lg): (1)
7For
2
81 · µi + µj ·
9
4 the preferred group size increases to 3 and i and j are symmetric




4°i in which case N











µj + °j = c for all j 2 J.
11Symmetry of i and j, monotonicity and decreasing di®erences of hi and ci in
all arguments imply that vi(N) attains a maximum at N = N¤(n) in the space
A = N0 [ f(µ;°) 2 £ £ ¡ : µ + ° · µi + °ig. Hence, it is not possible to ¯nd
l 6= j 2 A such that (1) holds with °l + µl · °i + µi. The extension of this
argument to potential blocking coalitions with sets of agents L * N¤(n) is
straightforward as by De¯nition 2 vi(N) attains a maximum at N = N¤(n) in
the space An¡1 = fig[fL 2 (££¡)n0
: µl+°l · µi+°i8l 2 Ng as well. Hence,
for (1) to hold, there must be l 2 L with µl+°l > µi+°i. That is, a group N¤(n)
of agents symmetric at n is stable with respect to deviating coalitions of the
same size. Hence, a group N¤ such that N¤ = argmaxN2fN¤(n);n2Ng vj(N) for
all j 2 J, that is J are symmetric, is stable with respect to potential blocking
coalitions L containing only types l with µl + °l · µi + °i.
This implies that a collection P of ¯nite sets of agents containing only
groups of symmetric types is stable. Under P an agent i 2 Pi 2 P has no
deviating coalition. For any L such that vi(fi;Lg) > vi(Pi) there must be
l 2 L with µl + °l > µi + °i. By the above argument then vl(fl;Lg) < vl(Pl),
PL 2 P. Since vi(Pi) ¸ vi(Ni), Ni = fi;i;:::;ig, for all jNij > 0 by the previous
argument the assumption implies that i prefers Pi to fig. Hence, an allocation
P with only symmetric groups of agents is stable. ¥
Whether an allocation of symmetric agents will indeed emerge in equilib-
rium will depend heavily on the distribution of types in the economy. Hence,
Proposition 3 primarily aims to highlight the mechanism at work in the match-
ing market. Heterogenous coalitions form if there exist types such that gains
from specialization outweigh potentially di®ering levels of inputs, yet hetero-
geneity is limited by non-transferable utility in that peers in groups are of
similar attractiveness to the market.
4.2 Participation
Of particular interest is which agents will form into social groups and which
agents will choose to remain solitary. Start by noting that for any agent who
chooses to remain unmatched by decreasing returns to group size the following
must hold.
hi(fig) + ci(fig) > hi(fi;ig) + ci(fi;ig): (2)
This means a necessary condition for unmatched agents is given by su±ciently
severe congestion. To translate this into a condition on the primitives requires
putting more structure on the congestion function. However, only agents
12matching into homogenous coalition are pushed to their lower utility bound-
ary. All other agent types must receive more than their segregation payo®.
Note that singletons are homogenous groups with optimal size 1 in the termi-
nology of Proposition 2. Therefore a su±cient condition for agent i to remain
unmatched in equilibrium is given by (2) and the condition in Proposition
(2), that is there does not exist a type j 6= i with positive measure so that
sgn(°i ¡ °j) 6= sgn(µi ¡ µj), both j°i ¡ °jj and jµi ¡ µjj su±ciently great, and
there exist mutual gains from trade.
That is, agents whose potential gains from trade are comparatively small
are likeliest to remain unmatched. Gains from trade for agent i by matching
into group N provided the remaining group members accept i are given by
hi(N) + ci(N) ¡ (hi(Ni) + ci(Ni));
where Ni denotes a homogenous group of i agents of size jNj. Expanding
the term shows that gains from trade depend positively on the distance of
attributes in each dimension. Hence, agents with balanced attributes, that is




@i is comparatively low, have little to
gain from forming groups with other agents. This means whenever congestion
is severe for an agent type i, there are no gains from trade or location at an
componentwise extremum of the type dimension make it likely that i remains
unmatched in equilibrium.
4.3 Ability Tracking
Given that the issue of ability tracking has induced some interest in the recent
past we are interested in how it may a®ect the decentralized allocation in our
model. Ability tracking refers to the policy of segregating students of similar
ability. Although the assumption of decreasing di®erences in generating peer
e®ects seems to suggest that ability tracking cannot be bene¯cial from the
perspective of a social planner, we have to provide two caveats.
Ability tracking can be incorporated in the model as partitioning the agent
space along the ability dimension. Note ¯rst that a change in the partitioning
of the agent space can never induce a Pareto superior allocation if preferences
over social groups are strict or there is some degree of transferability. Secondly,
when ability tracking is introduced, indirect e®ects may dominate the direct
e®ect from decreasing di®erences and both human capital production and
aggregate utility may increase. Consider the simple example depicted in Figure
1 (for the numerical example see the Appendix). Preferences are such that
groups size is bounded above by 2 and there are equal measures of agents
types A, B, C, and D. A prefers B to A and A to everyone else. B prefers C
13to both A and D, and A to B. C prefers B to D and D to C, while D prefers
C to D. Under ability tracking, symbolized by the dotted line separating the
agent space, A will match with B and C with D. Without ability tracking
B and C match into a social group while A and D segregate. Note that it
is possible to slightly adjust preferences in this example so that introducing

























Figure 1: Introducing Ability Tracking
That is, separating the type space may break up relatively homogenous
groups thereby enabling more heterogenous groups. This is favored, for in-
stance, by high in-group correlation of types without ability tracking. This ex-
ample primarily aims to highlight that assessing the consequences of a regime
change is not obvious even when assuming decreasing di®erences in human
capital production.
5 E®ort Investment
This section looks at a simple extension of the baseline model by letting agents
choose e®ort levels on each dimension. This may introduce limited transfer-
ability of utility when e®ort levels proposed explicitly or implicitly at the
matching stage are credible. Therefore both cases, with and without commit-
ment, are considered. The results prove to be reasonably robust, as in the case
of no commitment power, there is a unique Nash equilibrium within a group
and this essentially permits the above analysis to hold true. In case of com-
mitment power Proposition 2 continues to hold if the inputs are su±ciently
complementary in the classical sense as to induce su±cient productivity loss
when moving away from the optimal factor input ratio.
145.1 Framework
In this section agents have the opportunity to exert e®ort in order to provide
consumption and production peer e®ects. Denote agent i's e®ort levels in
consumption peer e®ects by gi 2 R and by fi 2 R in production peer e®ects.
Exerting e®ort comes at a utility cost of kc(gi;°i) and kh(fi;µi), respectively.
An agent's cost of e®ort is a®ected by his type. The utility is additively
separable, so that an agent's utility function becomes ui = ci + hi ¡ kc ¡ kh.
Cost functions are strictly convex in investments gi, fi and di®er across agents
only by the parameters °i and µi. In particular, we assume that higher types
always face higher marginal costs all else equal.
Assumption 2 (Single crossing) For all i;j 2 I:
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This means the higher an agent's type the lower the marginal cost for produc-
ing peer e®ects at any given level of peer e®ects. Production of peer e®ects is
adapted to the introduction of e®ort. Consumption peer e®ects in a group N
are generated according to the function ci((fj;gj)j2N. Production peer e®ects
are generated according to the function hi((fj;gj)j2N).
Unfortunately, it is necessary to put some more regularity on the func-
tions ci and hi to ensure tractability of the model when allowing for e®ort
investments.
Assumption 3 (Peer e®ect production) In addition to Assumption 1 the
functions ci and hi have the following properties.
(i) ci(N;f;g) = ci((gj)j2N) and hi(N;f;g) = hi((fj)j2N,
(ii) for all i;j 2 I, ci and hi are linear transformations of cj and hj, respec-
tively.
Part (i) of this assumption assumes separability of consumption and produc-
tion peer e®ects and (ii) is needed for comparative static analysis.
5.2 Agents' valuations
An agent i's valuation from being matched into group N depends on the invest-
ments in peer e®ects of the other group members and on his own investment
net of e®ort cost and is denoted by vi.
vi(N;f;g) = ci((fj;gj)j2N) + hi((fj;gj)j2N) ¡ kc(gi;°i) ¡ kh(fi;µi):
15If an agent i remains solitary his valuation is given by vi(i;f¤
i ;g¤
i ) ¸ 0 where
(f¤
i ;g¤
i ) maximizes ci + hi ¡ kc(gi;°i) ¡ kh(fi;µi). Given the assumptions on
regularity this program has always a unique solution. Note that vi(:) is sub-
modular in (f;g) due to decreasing returns to scale in Assumption 1.
5.3 Equilibrium Concept
The equilibrium concept employed needs some modi¯cation as well in order to
account for e®ort decisions. Let a matching equilibrium with e®ort investments
under commitment be de¯ned as follows.
De¯nition 3 A matching equilibrium denoted by (P¤;f¤;g¤) is a partition
P¤ of the agent space I into ¯nite coalitions and individual investment plans
in human capital f¤ and social activities g¤ such that
² P¤ is measure consistent, and
² @P0







i ) 8i 2 P0
i (stability).
The key di®erence to section 3 is that with e®ort investment and commitment
there arises a limited opportunity for transferring utility between group mem-
bers. Existence is straightforward by a version of the proof of Proposition
1.
5.4 Constrained e±cient investments
Let an agent i be member of social group N of size n. Let V (N;f;g) =
P
i2N vi(N;f;g) denote the value of a group N given vectors of investments
(f;g). Surplus maximizing investments within this social group solve the fol-























Denote the investment vectors de¯ned by these equations by f¤ and g¤.
Then de¯ne the potential value of a coalition N by





16V ¤(N) is the highest attainable sum of utilities in social group N. Note,
however, that (f¤
i ;g¤
i )i2N pins down uniquely the allocation of the surplus
among group members. The allocation of surplus within the group can be
changed by varying investment levels of agents. This induces a fundamental
nontransferability of utility. De¯ne now the utility possibility frontier Ái(u¡i)
of agent i 2 N in group N by the maximum amount of utility i can secure for
himself provided all agents j 6= i 2 N obtain at least uj each. u¡i is shorthand
for the vector of the remaining agents' minimum utility.
Ái(N;u¡i) = max
(fj;gj);j2N
vi(N;g;f) s.t. 8 j 6= i 2 N;vj(N;g;f) = uj ¸ 0: (5)
Note that for su±ciently high uj this maximization problem has no solution.
Set in this case Ái(u¡i) = 0. Then the utility possibility frontier of coalition
N, ©(N) can be written as
©(N) = fu 2 Rn : ui = Ái(u¡i) 8i 2 Ng:
©(N) gives all distributions of surplus within group N on the e±cient frontier.
The optimization problem (5) requires agents to choose investments as to
minimize utility cost when providing a given utility level to the other group
members. That means for all points of ©(N) all members of N have to equate
their marginal costs of investment in human capital and social activities.
For all points u 2 ©(N) it must hold that the associated investment levels
























8j 6= i 2 N;
h(g;f) + c(g;f) ¡ kh(fj) ¡ kc(gj) = uj 8j 6= i 2 N:
where ¸j denote the Lagrange multipliers. Necessary conditions for invest-
ment in gi are derived analogously. Let us state now a number of technical
preliminaries that will become useful later on.
Lemma 1 (Monotonicity) For any N 2 F(I), it holds for all i 2 N that
°i > °j ) g¤
i > g¤
j and µi > µj ) f¤
i > f¤
j for g¤ and f¤ that solve (3).
Proof: f¤ and g¤ solve problem (3). Hence, the necessary conditions (4) hold.
Let us focus on investments in productive peer e®ects ¯rst. Symmetry and













17By convexity of the cost function and single crossing in Assumption 2 it holds
that



























for some well-de¯ned f(µi;µj;f¤
j ) > f¤
j . Using the identities (4) and equiva-
lence (6) the ¯rst case yields a contradiction. Hence, using (4) and (6),
µi > µj ) f(µi;µj;f¤
j ) > f¤
i > f¤
j :
An analogous argument hold for g¤. ¥
De¯ne now the surplus maximizing group size of a homogenous group of
type (°;µ) agents, n¤(°;µ).
n¤(°;µ) = argmax
n V ¤(N) with n = jNj and (°i;µi) = (°;µ) 8i 2 N: (8)
Denote such a group by N¤(°;µ). Then V ¤(N¤(°;µ)) gives the maximal value
of a homogenous coalition. The following lemma shows that this determines
an agent i's minimal payo® in a matching equilibrium, v(°;µ).
Lemma 2 (Segregation Payo®s) In any matching equilibrium, an agent i of
type (°;µ) obtains at least payo®
v(°;µ) = h(g¤
1;:::;g¤




i = g¤ and f¤
i = f¤, with i = 1;:::;n¤(°;µ) solve (4) for N¤(°;µ) and
n¤(°;µ) is de¯ned as in (8).
Proof : All types are endowed with positive measure. Hence, an agent i of type
(°;µ) cannot receive less payo® in an equilibrium group than by matching into
a homogeneous group. The homogeneous group generating maximum surplus
is given by N¤(°;µ). Constrained e±cient investments f¤
i and g¤
i are given by





j with i 6= j 2 N¤(°;µ). Therefore any agent i of type (°;µ) can secure
himself at least payo® v(°;µ) = h(g¤)¡kc(g¤)+h(f¤)¡kh(f¤) in an e±cient
homogeneous coalition N¤(°;µ).
For any equilibrium with positive measure of a homogeneous coalition N,
each i 2 N must receive the same payo® and (n;f;g) must maximize group
surplus under equal sharing. Hence, the only stable homogeneous coalition is
N¤(°;µ) with investments f¤(N¤(°;µ)) and g¤(N¤(°;µ)). Otherwise, there is
18a positive measure of agents with lower payo® who are able to form this group
and thus obtain strictly higher payo®s. ¥
Lemma 2 gives agents' segregation payo®s which coincide with payo®s of
agents matched into homogenous coalitions with positive measure in equilib-
rium. Moreover, the regularity assumptions on the production function and
cost allow us to state the following important preliminary that will become
useful for determing the e±ciency benchmark.
Lemma 3 V ¤(N) is strictly increasing and strictly submodular in members'
types (°;µ).
Proof : The system of equations (4) de¯nes f¤(N;µ) and g¤(N;°) because of
separability of utility. Di®erentiating V ¤(N) = V (N;g¤(N;°);f¤(N;µ)) with




































Because of monotonicity of investments in types from Lemma 1 and decreasing
returns to scale from Assumption 1, indeed it must hold that
@g¤
i (°)
@°j < 0, and
likewise for µ. Hence, the cross partial derivatives are strictly negative and
V ¤(N) is strictly submodular in the vectors of types, ° and µ.8 ¥
5.5 Benchmark
We are interested in a benchmark allocation to compare with matching out-
comes. To re°ect potentially diverging interests in human capital formation
and utility we provide two benchmarks. The ¯rst maximizes the sum of utilities
in the economy and can be derived by the allocation (PU;fU;gU). The second
benchmark is the allocation maximizing human capital formation, (PH;fH).
Submodularity of V ¤(N) in types and separability of the utility function then
imply almost immediately the following proposition.
8There is another way of proof by preservation of supermodularity under maximization,
see Theorems 2.6.2 and 2.7.6 in Topkis (1998); however, it involves some more notation.
19Proposition 4 Both benchmark allocations, (PU;fU;gU) and (PH;fH), are
characterized by negative assortative matching on each type dimension, that is
groups must be heterogeneous along each dimension.
Proof: Let P 2 PU with P = f(°1;µ1);:::;(°n;µn)g. The value of group P is








for all partitions P0 of
SjPj
i=1 P. That is, partitioning a subset
SjPj
i=1 P of the
agent space into jPj groups P must induce at least the same social surplus as
any partition of that subset of the agent space. Strict submodularity of V ¤(N)
in ° and µ from Lemma 3 implies strictly decreasing di®erences (Theorem 2.6.1
in Topkis, 1998). That is,
X
i2P




with strict inequality for °i 6= °j or µi 6= µj for at least one pair i 6= j 2 P. Thus
allocations that maximize aggregate surplus on each dimension of peer e®ects
must have heterogeneous groups along both type dimensions. This extends
to the allocation (PH;fH) as well because of separable utility. A surplus
maximizing allocation indeed exists, because both optimization problems are
equivalent to matching problems with fully transferable utility. Analogous to
the proof of Proposition 1 the matching problems can be rewritten to yield
convex games for which a solution exists (see Kaneko and Wooders, 1996).¥
Socially optimal outcomes always have heterogeneous groups with respect
to human capital acquisition. This result obviously depends on the assumption
of decreasing di®erences in peer e®ects. For increasing di®erences of c(:) the
proof can be reversed yielding a positive assortative matching pattern of the
benchmark allocation with respect to cost of consumption peer e®ects. It
is noteworthy though that negative assortative matching with respect to µ in
both benchmark allocations does not depend on the separability of utility. The
critical assumption is monotonicity, that is di®erences of h(:) are increasing
globally and independently from c(:).
5.6 Commitment
Suppose ¯rst that agents who form a social group have the possibility to choose
levels of individual investments in peer e®ects when forming the group. We
20assume that agents can indeed commit to these investment levels when group
production of human capital takes place. Several natural motivations come to
mind. Agents' behavior in social groups may be described best by a in¯nitely
repeated game. Hence, there exists the possibility of supporting equilibrium
allocations Pareto-dominating an equilibrium where every group member free
rides by adequate use of punishments in players' strategies. Secondly, social
groups can be interpreted to be formed on a daily basis, so that the assumption
of commitment power reduces really to assuming commitment power over a
very limited amount of time.9 Moreover, our results remain unchanged for
limited commitment as long as all groups have access to the same commitment
technology. However, individual heterogeneity of the agents with respect to
commitment ability could be accommodated by this model if it is possible to
interpret the ability to commit as part of an individual's social skills.
Given that agents are now able to transfer utility within groups by al-
locating e®ort levels among members it can no longer be expected that the
baseline results, notably Proposition 2, continue to hold. It has been shown
previously (e.g. in Legros and Newman, 2004) that as transferability improves
su±ciently sorting will inevitably match the pattern maximizing total surplus,
that is negative assortative in our case. Intuitively, under full transferability of
utility bad types can compensate better types fully for their presence. When
the bene¯t of a good type to a bad type exceeds the bene¯t of a good type to
a good type, bad types will be able to outbid good types in competition for
good types.
Due to monotonicity of constrained e±cient e®ort investments in type we
know that Proposition 2 holds point-wise for constrained e±cient e®ort levels.
That is, under constrained e±cient e®ort levels an agent of worse type and
strictly worse on at least one dimension cannot compensate an agent of higher
type. However, under e®ort investments transferability is limited. In order to
transfer utility among peers a group of agents will have to choose ine±cient
e®ort levels. For Proposition 2 to carry over the e±ciency loss incurred by a
departure from constrained e±cient e®ort investments must outweigh the gain
by exploiting submodularity of c(:) and h(:). Putting the condition in terms
of the utility possibility frontier yields that for all i;j 2 I with µj ¸ µi and
°j ¸ °i with one strict inequality it must hold that
Áj(N;(v(i))i2N0nfjg) < v(j):
However, the properties of the utility possibility frontier are notoriously hard
9Note that much of the literature on social loa¯ng in social psychology lends some support
to this argument, see for instance Karau and Williams (1993, 1997) and Shepperd (1993)
among others.
21to ascertain. Therefore a simple example may be in order.
5.6.1 An example
Let ¡££ = f1;2g£f1;2g, that is agents' types are binary in each dimension.
Assume that each type (°;µ) occurs with equal probability in the population
of agents. Cost of e®ort is assumed to be kc(gi;°i) =
°i
2 g2
i and kh(fi;µi) =
µi
2 f2
i . Specify the peer e®ect production technology by assuming ci(g1;:::;gn) =
pPn
i=1 gi if n · 2 and 0 otherwise; and hi(f1;:::;fn) =
pPn
i=1 fi if n · 2
and 0 otherwise. That is, groups have at most size n = 2. This parametric
speci¯cation is in line with Assumptions 2 and 1, except for strictly decreasing
returns to size which are only weakly decreasing in this example. As this
already su±ces to prevent groups of size n > 2, this deviation is of no further
























As we have shown above, the e±cient allocation is then given by negative
assortative matching on each dimension, that is for all groups N it must hold
that µi 6= µj and °i 6= °j for i 6= j 2 N. Combined with constrained e±cient
investments given by equations (4) this pins down the e±cient allocation P¤:
for all P¤
i 2 P¤, jP¤












with higher investment by the lower cost agent.
Now we turn to the utility possibility frontier of a social group N, ©(N)
which is of interest only for n = 2. Although the problem is quite simple,
deriving the utility possibility frontier is not trivial. Hence, we provide a
numerical solution in Figure 2 depicting the relevant utility possibility frontiers
in di®erent coalitions. The ¯rst tuple in the coalition denotes agent i's type
and the second one agent j's type.
To solve for the market allocation start by checking homogeneous groups
of low cost (1;1) agents. For stability group members have to split the surplus







That is, v(1;1) = 3
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3. Numerical analysis shows
that the maximum payo® of an agent i with type (1;1) when matching with
a (1;2) agent is given by Á(1;1)((1;1);(1;2);v(1;2)) = 1:8820 < v(1;1). This
corresponds to the dashed box in Figure 2: in a ((1;1);(1;2)) coalition the
second agent must obtain at least the same utility as from equal sharing in
a ((2;1);(1;2)) coalition. This leaves the ¯rst agent with less than splitting
the surplus in a ((1;1);(1;1)) coalition. Hence, groups consisting of both


























(1,2) (1,2) or (2,1) (2,1)





Figure 2: Utility possibility frontier for possible social groups
(1;2) and (1;1) agents are not stable. One can show by solving problem (5)
numerically, that the same argument goes through for (2;1) and (1;1) agents.
Hence, since vi((1;1);(1;1)) > vi(1;1), homogeneous coalitions of two (1;1)
agents are stable.
Now we turn to homogeneous groups of (2;1) and (1;2) agents, respectively.
It is immediate from decreasing returns to scale that there exist payo®s for
agents in ((2;1);(1;2)) or ((1;2);(2;1)) groups that dominate homogeneous
coalitions, that is Á(2;1)((2;1);(1;2);v(1;2)) > v(2;1) and vice versa. Note
that v(2;1) = v(1;2) due to the symmetry of the valuation function. Numeri-
cal analysis can be used to show that also v(2;1) > Á(2;1)((2;1);(2;2);v(2;2)) =
1:6840 and by symmetry also v(1;2) > Á(1;2)((1;2);(2;2);v(2;2)). Hence,
((2;1);(1;2)) or ((1;2);(2;1)) are stable. Since vi((2;2);(2;2)) > vi((2;2))
when splitting the surplus this also implies that homogeneous (2;2) groups
are stable as well.
The decentralized allocation in this little example is summarized in the
following table.
°i = 1 °i = 2
µi = 1 segregates matches with (1;2)
µi = 2 matches with (2;1) segregates
That is, the matching has segregation at the (component-wise) top and the
23(component-wise) bottom of the agent space. Agents in between form het-
erogeneous groups. Note that heterogeneous coalitions of intermediate types
(e.g. (1;2);(2;1)) dominate homogenous coalitions (e.g. (1;2);(2;1)). This
shifts the relevant utility possibility frontier in Figure 2 to the right which
induces homogenous coalitions of (1;1) and (2;2) agents to be stable. This
intuition lies at the heart of Proposition 2.
The matching pattern does not depend on the distribution of types among
agents although the distribution of payo®s does. Investment in peer e®ects are
constrained e±cient in homogeneous groups which depends on equal weighting
of peer e®ects but these groups are subject to mismatch. Sorting for inter-
mediate agents is e±cient, but investments may not be e±cient depending on
payo®s and thus on the type distribution.
5.7 No Commitment
Let us assume now that agents do not possess the power to commit to e®ort
levels announced at the matching stage but play a noncooperative investment
game within groups. Start by analyzing the within group game in some coali-
tion N 2 F(I). An agent i 2 N's strategy space is given by (fi;gi) 2 F £ G,
his payo® by vi(N;f;g) where g and f are (1£n) vectors of investment levels.
Proposition 5 (Noncooperative investments)
(i) The game (G£F;vi;i 2 N) has a nonempty, Pareto-rankable set of Nash
equilibria (f¤;g¤).
(ii) For any equilibrium agent i's investment f¤
i (g¤
i ) strictly increases in
own type µi (°i) and the remaining players' investment f¤
j (g¤
j) strictly
decreases in i's type µi (°i), j 2 N n fig.
(iii) vi(N;f¤;g¤) strictly decreases in own type µi (°i) and strictly increases
in another player's type µj (°j), j 2 N n fig.
(iv) vi(N;f¤;g¤) has decreasing di®erences in (µj)j2N, vi(N;f¤;g¤) has de-
creasing di®erences in (°j)j2N.
Proof: In Appendix.
Part (i) of the proposition implies that applying the Pareto criterion for
equilibrium selection the equilibrium e®ort levels are unique. Hence, there
exist functions f¤
i : F(I) 7! F and g¤
i : F(I) 7! G determining e®ort levels of
24all i 2 N for any N 2 F(I). That is, an agent i's valuation vi(N) depends







i (N);µi) ¡ kc(g¤
i (N);°i):
Combined with part (iv) this implies that v¤
i (N) = vi(N;f¤;g¤) is submodular
on £ £ ¡. This is quite useful as Propositions 2 and 3 can be applied.
Part (ii) and (iii) give some intuition on the mechanics under noncooper-
ative investments. E®ort investments are determined by an agent's relative
cost of e®ort. Hence, a high cost type on both dimensions will free ride on
e®ort investments and therefore will not be accepted by any type with lower
cost type on both dimensions. Moreover, equilibrium investment levels are
monotone in type and do not fully internalize submodularity of the e®ort pro-
vision technology. Hence, there are gains from specialization at the matching
stage and heterogenous groups of agents from the interior of the type space
may emerge.
6 Conclusion
This paper has developed a framework for the economic analysis of social group
formation. It implies a number of testable predictions, such as a nonlinear
correlation between group members' attributes in the attribute, heterogeneity
in taste types among group members for some groups, and higher participa-
tion rates among agents with higher attribute di®erence between dimensions.
Equilibrium allocations fail to maximize human capital production or aggre-
gate utility but tend to be Pareto optimal, in particular when allowing for
e®ort choice under commitment. Yet even under the assumption of decreasing
di®erences in human capital production it turns out that introducing ability
tracking may be bene¯cial to human capital accumulation.
A Appendix: Proofs
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1
For the proof of existence a modi¯ed version of vi, vM
i , is needed to construct
a super-additive characteristic function of the game along the lines of Shubik
and Wooders (1983). That means it must be ensured that any union of disjoint
coalitions must be able to reach the same allocation as the disjoint coalitions.
Hence we de¯ne vM
i (Pi;N) = vi(Pi), where N 2 F(I) and Pi ½ N. vM
i
25speci¯es agent i's valuation for being member of group Pi which may or may
not coincide with coalition N. Now let V (N) denote the characteristic function
of the assignment game (I;vM
i ) where N 2 F(I) and PN is a partition of N.
V (N) = f(vM
i (P;Pi)i2N : 8 i 2 N; Pi 2 PN)g:
Then construct the comprehensive extension of V (N) by de¯ning
^ V (N) = fx 2 RjNj : x · V (N)g:
^ V (N) de¯nes a set in RjNj that is bounded above by V (N) for any ¯nite set
of agents N. Then ^ V (N) has the following properties:
^ V is a non-empty, closed subset of Rp 8 P 2 F; (9)
^ V (P) £ ^ V (O) µ ^ V (P [ O) 8 O;P 2 F(I) with O \ F = ;; (10)
inf sup ^ V (fig) > ¡1; (11)
for any N 2 F(I);x 2 ^ V (N) and y 2 Rp with y · x;y 2 ^ V (N); (12)






is non-empty and bounded.(13)
Properties 9, 10 and 12 follow directly by de¯nition of vi, vM
i and ^ V , respec-
tively. Property 11 follows from the existence of an outside option, V (fig) ¸ 0.
This and vi(Pi) > 0 for all set of agents 1 < jPij < ¹ n from Assumption 1 also
imply property 13. Therefore ^ V is a characteristic function in the sense of
Kaneko and Wooders (1986).
Denote by N(µ;°)fi 2 N : (µi;°i) = (µ;°)g a subset of N of positive mea-
sure containing all agents of types (µ;°). Then there exists a partition of
N into subsets of equal types, (N(µk;°k))T
k=1. Hence, the game (I; ^ V ) has the
r-property with respect to (N(µk;°k))T
k=1 in the terminology of Kaneko and
Wooders (1986).
The game (I; ^ V ) is per-capita bounded with respect to (N(µk;°k))T
k=1 i®
there is a positive real number 0 < ± < 1 and a K 2 R such that for any
S 2 F(I), where payo®s x 2 ^ V (S) are such that xi = xj for all i;j 2 Nk \ S




jSj ¸ (1 ¡ ±)
¹(Nk)
¹(N) implies xi < K for all
i 2 S.
Any agent i 2 S obtains some payo® xi 2 ^ V (S). By construction of ^ V
and strict non-transferability, xi · vi(Si) with Si ½ S such that i 2 Si. By
Assumption 1 there exists ¹ n(µi;°i) < 1 such that vi( ¹ N) ¸ vi( ¹ N [ N0) where
¹ N ½ Ni and N0 ½ Ni. Hence, vi(Si) < 1 for all i 2 N and Si. An upper
bound K can be obtained by setting K = maxi2I vi. Thus (I; ^ V ) is per-capita
bounded.
26Now we are in a position to apply Theorem 1 from Kaneko and Wooders
(1986) and existence of the f-core of the characteristic function game associated
with ^ V follows. What remains to be shown is that an allocation in the f-core
of ^ V is also an equilibrium as de¯ned above. A vector of payo®s in the f-core
of ^ V , ^ x 2 ^ V (N) cannot be improved upon, that is there exists no S 2 F(I)
with x0 2 ^ V (S) such that x0 > x for each i 2 S. By construction of ^ V there
must exist x 2 V (N) with x ¸ ^ x. Hence, neither can x be improved upon.
Then the partition (PN) of N such that xi = vi(Pi) with Pi 2 PN and i 2 Pi
for all i 2 N de¯nes the equilibrium coalitions in the sense of our equilibrium
de¯nition. ¥
A.2 Example for Ability Tracking
Suppose there are four types of agents, A, B, C, and D with equal measures.








for all N with jNj · 2 and by Vi(N) = 0 if jNj > 2. This implies the
preference ordering given in Section 4.3 for instance if parameter values are
µA = 4, °A = 1, ¯A = 0:718, µB = 2:5, °B = 2:25, ¯B = 0:983, µC = 2:25,
°C = 2:5, ¯C = 1:016, µD = 1, °D = 4, ¯D = 1:392. It is easy to verify that
without partitioning of the type space B and C match together, A prefers
segregation to D, and therefore D segregates as well. Splitting the agent space
at µ = 2:3 for instance, yields the matches A and B, and C and D since all






µB + µC < 2
p
µA + µB + 2
p
µC + µD and likewise for the
sum of valuations. Setting ¯B = 0:9824 and ¯C = 1:0163 yields A »B C and
B »C D and therefore ability tracking Pareto dominates the regime without
it.
A.3 Proof of Proposition 5
(i) Existence is immediate as G£F is compact, fi and gi are continuous and vi
is continuously di®erentiable in (f;g). Note that f(:) is submodular in (f;g)
and ki(:) is supermodular in (fi;gi). Hence, (G£F;vi;i 2 N) is a submodular
game (see Topkis, 1998, for details). That means that the set of equilibria of
this game has a partial order and the lowest element of the set is Pareto best.
(ii) Agent i's reaction correspondence (gi;fi)(g¡i;f¡i) to other players'
strategies (f¡i;g¡i) can be written as fi(f¡i) and gi(g¡i) due to separability
27of consumption and production peer e®ects. The proof focusses on produc-
tion peer e®ects, extending it to consumption peer e®ects is straightforward.








It follows immediately from submodularity of hi(:) and convexity of kh(:) that
fi decreases in f¡i. The next step is to establish that fi increases and f¡i
decrease in µi. Suppose the ¯rst order conditions (14) hold for all i 2 N.
The proof proceeds by contradiction. Let µi decrease to µ0
i < µi. Suppose fi
increases to f0























by j's ¯rst order condition. This is a contradiction to (15) due to part (ii) of
Assumption 3. Hence, f0
i < fi.
Suppose now there is some j 2 N n fig such that f0









as argued above. From above we know that f0
i < fi and thus by submodularity
of hi(:) there must be an l 2 N n fig with f0
l > fl. For n = 2, j = l which







¯rst order condition. By part (ii) of Assumption 3 this contradicts (16) and
f0
j > fj for all j 2 N n fig.
(iii) Di®erentiating vi(N;f¤;g¤) with respect to µi ceteris paribus and ap-













By part (ii) of this proof this expression must be negative. Now let µj decrease
to µ0
j < µj. As shown above, f0







strict monotonicity of both hi(:) and kh(:), hi(f0) < hi(f) and kh(f0
i) > kh(fi)
and thus vi(N;f0;g) < vi(N;f;g).
(iv) It su±ces to establish that expression (17) is decreasing in µj. Let µj
increase to µ0







@µi . Let µj increase to µ0









@fl for all l 6= i 2 N.










@µi . That is,
































@fi . The latter is weakly increasing in f¤
i due to
decreasing di®erences and strict convexity of kh(:) from Assumption 2. Since
f¤
i (µi;µj) > f¤
i (µi;µ0






j (µi;µj)) · 0. This means, by separability of hi(:)
and ci(:), vi(f¤) has decreasing di®erences in µ. ¥
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